I don't know, but I certainly am not. However, this is different from believing that corruption is the most serious problem facing developing countries. Many development newbies suffer from the corruption obsession, the view that anti-corruption policies ("governance reform") is the most direct route to achieving growth and equity. Wolfowitz exhibited severe symptoms of this, and much of the commentary around his departure has been marked by a similar misunderstanding. In today's NYT, for example, Christopher Burnham, a former Bush administration official, writes:
When Mr. Wolfowitz took over the bank in 2005, he preached the anti-corruption gospel with a zeal that alarmed many career bank staff members and more than a few of its 185 member countries. With his departure, it is eminently possible that his laser-like focus on corruption will go with him.
Well, for one thing, the anti-corruption gospel at the Bank predates Wolfowitz. It was Wolfensohn who made anti-corruption a focal point at the Bank (as Burnham acknowledges in his oped). For another, I am not sure that it is good policy for the Bank to prioritize corruption--as a rule--over other problems that developing nations face. As I have stressed in my work with Ricardo Hausmann and Andres Velasco, the binding constraint on growth differs from country to country. In some cases (Zimbabwe?), governance problems are indeed the most serious binding constraint. In many others, the problems lie elsewhere--in low savings, poorly functioning financial markets, low entrepreneurship, poor infrastructure, and myriad other syndromes of underdevelopment.
Let me make a bolder claim. A development strategy that focused on anti-corruption in China would not have produced anything like the growth rate that this country has experienced since 1978, nor would it have resulted in 400 million plus fewer people in extreme poverty.